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Abstract. We develop a monopolistic competition model with non-homothetic factor
input bundles where increasing quality requires increasing use of skilled workers. As a
result more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher priced goods. Using a
multi-country dataset, we test and conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Schott (2004) of a positive effect
of skill abundance on unit values identiﬁed with US data. We extend the core model with
per unit trade costs leading to theWashington apples effect that goods shipped over larger
distance are of higher quality. The combination of high-quality goods being relatively
skill intensive with the Washington apples effect implies that countries at a larger distance
from their trading partners display a higher skill premium. Simulating our model, we ﬁnd
that a doubling of distance of a country relative to all its trading partners raises the skill
premium in a country by about 1.6%.
Re´sume´. Les couˆts du commerce, qualite´, et la prime au travail qualiﬁe´. Les auteurs de´velop-
pent un mode`le de concurrence monopolistique avec des ensembles d’intrants non ho-
mothe´tiques ou` une qualite´ accrue re´clame l’utilisation accrue de travailleurs qualiﬁe´s.
En conse´quence, les pays ou` relativement abondent les travailleurs qualiﬁe´s exportent des
produits de plus haute qualite´ et a` prix plus e´leve´s. A` l’aide de donne´es pour plusieurs pays,
onmet au test et on conﬁrme les re´sultats de Schott (2004) – pour des donne´es ame´ricaines
– a` l’effet que l’abondance de qualiﬁcations dans un pays a un effet positif sur la valeur
ajoute´e. On applique son mode`le a` des donne´es pour plusieurs pays. On modiﬁe le cœur
du mode`le en utilisant les couˆts du commerce par unite´ de commerce ce qui de´bouche sur
l’effet des pommes deWashington a` savoir que les produits transporte´s sur de plus grandes
distances sont de plus haute qualite´. La combinaison de ces deux forces (le fait que les
produits de plus haute qualite´ re´clament plus de travail qualiﬁe´, et l’effet des pommes de
Washington) sugge`re que les pays a` plus grande distance de leurs partenaires commerci-
aux jouissent d’une prime au travail qualiﬁe´. Les simulations du mode`le re´ve`lent qu’un
doublement de la distance entre un pays par rapport a` tous ses partenaires commerciaux
voudrait dire un accroissement de la prime au travail qualiﬁe´ de ce pays de l’ordre de 1.6%
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1. Introduction
In a seminal paper based on US import data, Schott (2004) found that traded
goods prices within detailed product categories rise in the skill and capital abun-
dance of the exporting country. As such he provided evidence for within-sector
specialization. Broadly speaking, goods prices vary systematically even for simi-
lar goods sharing the same detailed product classiﬁcation. More skill-abundant
and capital-abundant countries export goods with higher prices. Higher prices
are taken as evidence of higher quality.
While Schott’s (2004) ﬁndings highlight the importance of exporter charac-
teristics, and especially skill abundance in exporting countries, the theoretical
literature that followed has focused instead on explanations based on distance
and importer characteristics in explaining international pricing patterns.1 The
related empirical literature has also followed this route. As such, we are left with
evidence based largely on one country, the US, with respect to exporter charac-
teristics.
In this paper, we return to Schott’s original observations on exporters and
test his ﬁndings on the effect of skill abundance on traded goods prices employ-
ing a multi-country dataset with multiple exporters and importers. Compared to
Schott, our data allow for inclusion of various ﬁxed effects to control for pos-
sible omitted variables, and we also estimate nonlinear speciﬁcations. After the
empirical exercise, we model the link between skill abundance and pricing in a
monopolistic competition framework with homogeneous ﬁrms in the spirit of
Krugman (1980), adding a role for quality. So, preferences are CES including a
taste parameter as a measure for quality. We work with a variant of the Krug-
man model developed by Venables (1994) with ﬁxed export costs besides regular
ﬁxed costs.2 This implies separate free entry conditions for each destination mar-
ket and the possibility that only a subset of ﬁrms export. There are two factor
inputs, high skilled and low skilled labour, and factor input bundles are non-
homothetic. Goods with higher quality require relatively more skilled labour.
Moreover, similar to Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Feenstra and Romalis
(2014), the marginal cost parameter rises with quality. This setup gives a straight-
forward explanation for the relation between exporter skill abundance and traded
goods prices in Schott (2004). In relatively skill abundant countries, the relative
wage of skilled workers is lower, implying a lower cost of producing high quality
1 Manova and Zhang (2012), Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Crozet et al.
(2012), Martin (2012), Go¨rg et al. (2010), Bastos and Silva (2010) and Hallak and Sivadasan
(2010) are examples of studies with ﬁrm level prices. Hummels and Skiba (2004), Hummels and
Lugovskyy (2009), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Harrigan et al. (2011) and Bekkers et al.
(2012) use average prices at various HS levels.
2 The model setup of Venables (1994) with destination-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs is chosen to keep the
model tractable enough to derive analytical results. Generating an effect of skill abundance on
quality requires a non-homothetic cost function. This reduces the tractability of the model
implying that we need to keep other modelling features as basic as possible. As we are interested
in explaining aggregate traded goods prices and not ﬁrm level prices, we can abstract from ﬁrm
heterogeneity as used, for example, in Bernard et al. (2007).
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goods. This raises the incentive for ﬁrms to produce higher quality goods. And
goods of higher quality display higher marginal costs raising the price.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a basic model to analytically derive the impact of skill abun-
dance on traded goods prices. Then, we extend the basic framework with two
additional elements from the literature on traded goods prices and solve the
model with simulations. First, we add per unit trade costs to the model, besides
the standard iceberg trade costs. This generates a Washington apples effect as
in Hummels and Skiba (2004). Goods shipped at larger distance have a higher
quality. Second, we include a taste for quality parameter on the demand side and
following Hallak (2006) this parameter is a function of income per capita. This
implies that richer consumers demand higher quality goods. With quality being
relatively skill-intensive countries at a larger distance from their trading partners
will produce higher quality goods raising the relative demand for skilled workers
and thus the skill premium.
We solve the extended model numerically calibrating it to actual income,
income per capita and distance data for the largest countries in the empirics.
Parameters appearing in Feenstra and Romalis (2014) are set as estimated by
these scholars. The remaining parameters are taken from the literature and set
such that the estimated elasticities of the FOB price with respect to skill abun-
dance and distance employing data following frommodel simulations are close to
the elasticities estimated with real-world data. Model simulations show that the
combination of per unit trade costs and high-quality goods being skill intensive
generates an intuitive relationship between trade costs and the skill premium.
An increase in distance raising per unit trade costs relative to ad valorem trade
costs generates a Washington apples effect, raises the quality of exporter’s goods
and therefore also the demand for skilled workers. Simulations show that a dou-
bling of distance of a country from its trading partners raises the skill premium
by 1.6%. Our simulations indicate that there is also a demand-side effect on the
distribution of income. Richer consumers beneﬁt more from quality increases
as quality as they have a higher valuation for quality. This reinforces the effect
on the nominal skill premium, although the effect in our simulations is an order
smaller than the effect on the nominal skill premium.
Basedon theabove expositionour contribution to the literature is thus twofold.
First, we introduce amechanism throughwhich distance affects the skill premium
as a result of the combination of the Washington apples effect and the relative
skill intensity of high quality goods. Second, we provide an evaluation of Schott’s
US-based resultswith respect to factor abundance using awider dataset on traded
goods prices with multiple importers and exporters.
For the empirics, we employ a large, multi-country dataset with product level
(HS6) unit values for the period 2000–2004. The empirics conﬁrm the main pre-
diction of our model and the ﬁndings in Schott (2004). A larger relative skill
abundance of the exporting country leads to higher traded goods prices. Based
upon our model, we also examine the effect of distance and exporter GDP
per capita on unit values. We include an importer-product-time ﬁxed effect to
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capture the role of importer GDP per capita and variation in the deﬁnition of
unit values across products. With this ﬁxed effect, we can also account for other
relevant demand side variables not present in our theoretical model like market
size and income inequality. The coefﬁcients on distance and exporter GDP per
capita have the expected positive signs. We estimate the same model including
nonlinear terms. The results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the (log) linear model with
marginal effects close to the linear speciﬁcation.
The related literature can be split up into three parts, ﬁrst work on explaining
traded goods prices, second work on between country differences in the incentive
to produce quality and third work on trade and inequality. Most theoretical
work explaining traded goods prices focuses on demand side characteristics,3 on
distance4 or on ﬁrm characteristics.5 The work by Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
includes many elements of this literature. Feenstra and Romalis (2014) set up a
ﬁrm heterogeneity model of quality differentiation with per unit trade costs and
demand forquality varyingwith importer incomeper capita.They estimatemodel
parameters structurally, using trade and price data. In our model simulations, we
build on Feenstra and Romalis (2014), by using their estimated elasticities and
extending their framework with a role for factor abundance on the supply side.
Flam and Helpman (1987), Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Fieler (2012)
also model between country differences in the incentive to produce and export
goods of different quality. In these papers differences in the ability to produce
quality stem fromabsolute productivity differences between countries, but are not
related to factor abundance.6 Early work related to our paper is Falvey (1981),
who develops a speciﬁc factors model to explain intra-industry trade as a result
of factor differences between countries. Although his model also features quality
differentiation endogenous to factor differences, he does not purport to relate
prices to country characteristics and instead focuses on explaining intra-industry
trade with factor differences.7
Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) combine non-homothetic preferences with increas-
ing returns in production, showing that richer countries specialize in the
production of high-quality goods. Although our extended model also contains
non-homothetic preferences, there is no home-market effect of quality special-
ization in our model. The reason is that quality and ﬁxed costs are destination-
speciﬁc: ﬁrms have to pay ﬁxed costs to enter each market and sell a different
3 See, for example, Flam and Helpman (1987), Hallak (2006), Hsieh and Klenow (2007),
Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009), Simonovska (2010), Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) and
Bekkers et al. (2012).
4 See, among others, Hummels and Skiba (2004), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011).
5 See, among others, Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and Hallak and Sivadasan
(2010).
6 Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) relate the quality of output to quality of inputs in a model where
more productive ﬁrms use higher quality inputs, because of complementarity between
productivity and input quality.
7 Bekkers (2016) proposes a different mechanism to explain the effect of skill abundance on quality
and traded goods prices. In a ﬁrm heterogeneity model, ﬁrms can raise the quality of their goods
by investing more in innovation. With factor input bundles in innovation being relatively skill
intensive, more skill abundant countries produce higher quality, higher priced goods.
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quality level to each country. So, having a large home market for high-quality
goods does not imply that high-quality goods are also exported by more ﬁrms.
Dingel (2014) models the twomechanisms in Schott (2004) and Fajgelbaum et al.
(2011) leading to a positive effect of exporter income per capita on the quality
of exports and determines the relative importance of the two mechanisms with
data on intra-US trade. Our model does not feature the home-market effect. In-
stead, we include per unit trade costs generating an effect of distance on the skill
premium, also solving our model numerically to quantify the effect.
The recent literature on trade and inequality has proposed various mecha-
nisms to explain rising inequality in all countries as a result of trade liberal-
ization, moving away from the traditional Heckscher–Ohlin framework where
inequality effects differ according to relative factor abundance of the country.
Four sets of studies are related to our work. First, Verhoogen (2008) shows how
trade liberalization can raise wage inequality in a ﬁrm heterogeneity model where
more productive ﬁrms produce higher quality goods and pay higher wages. Trade
liberalization will reallocate market shares towards more productive exporting
ﬁrms paying higher wages and thus raising wage inequality. Burstein and Vogel
(2012) and Harrigan and Reshef (2011) model a similar mechanism in a ﬁrm
heterogeneity model with more productive ﬁrms beingmore skill intensive. Trade
liberalization reallocates market shares towards more productive and more skill
intensive ﬁrms, raising the demand for skills and thus the skill premium. Similar
to these models, in our model higher quality goods (or more productive ﬁrms)
are also more skill intensive. The way in which changes in trade costs generate
more demand for quality instead is different. In thementioned studies this occurs
through a reallocation effect towards more productive ﬁrms and in our paper this
occurs through a change in the strength of theWashington apples effect: when per
unit trade costs become more important relative to ad valorem trade costs, the
demand for quality rises. Second, Caron et al. (2011) show that there is a positive
relation between the sectoral income elasticity of demand and the skill intensity,
implying that rising income will lead to increased demand for skills thus raising
the skill premium.8 Our model features a similar mechanism, as rising income
(possibly as a result of trade liberalization) raises the demand for high-quality and
thus more skill-intensive goods. Third, Matsuyama (2007) shows that trade can
drive up inequality if activities related to international business are relatively skill
intensive. Fourth, Fajgelbaum andKhandelwal (2014) show that trade affects the
income distribution through the demand side under non-homothetic preferences,
a mechanism also present in our model. Fajgelbaum andKhandelwal (2014) ﬁnd
that trade in general is good for poor consumers.
The next section starts with an analysis of the multi-country price data pro-
viding motivating evidence for the theoretical model. Section 3 outlines both the
baseline theoretical model on the role of factor abundance and themodel with ex-
tensions. In section 4, we present a numerical analysis of the extended theoretical
model, and section 5 concludes.
8 The published version, Caron et al. (2014), does not discuss the skill premium implications.
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2. Motivating evidence
Before developing a theoretical model, we ﬁrst explore the link between traded
goods prices and skill abundance with a multi-country dataset, extending the
work by Schott (2004) who employed only data on exports to the US. We proxy
traded goods prices with unit values. The data used for unit values come from
the BACI database,9 which contains the quantity and value of bilateral imports
in six-digit Harmonized System (HS) classiﬁcation. The database is constructed
from COMTRADE (Commodities Trade Statistics database). We use data for
the period between 2000–2004. BACI takes advantage of the double information
on each trade ﬂow to ﬁll out the matrix of bilateral world trade providing a
“reconciled” value for each ﬂow reported at least by one of the partners. Therefore
the missing values in BACI are those concerning trade between non-reporting
countries.
Skill abundance and income per capita data originate from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicator database. We use GDP per capita as a measure of
income per capita. Similarly to Schott (2004), we deﬁne skilled labour as work-
ers with tertiary or secondary education, while unskilled labour as having only
primary education. Data on distance are taken from Clair et al. (2004).10 Some
descriptive statistics on our sample and the list of countries used in the regressions
based upon data availability can be found in the online appendix.
We include distance in all regressions to account for the Washington apples
effect meaning that quality rises with distance, an empirical ﬁnding ﬁrst discov-
ered by Alchian and Allen (1964) and explored in a trade setting by Hummels
and Skiba (2004). We control for the role of demand side variables like importer
market size and importer income inequality by including importer-time-product
ﬁxed effects. The product-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects serve to account for differences in
measurement of unit values across products.
Table 1 presents the estimation results. In column (1), we start with a linear
speciﬁcation with distance and skill abundance as explanatory variables, and
in column (2), we add GDP per capita as a control variable. Our results are
in line with the empirical results of Schott (2004) who found a positive effect of
exporter skill abundanceonunit valueswithUS importer data.We further explore
similarities and differences between our results and Schott (2004) in the online
appendix.Controlling forGDPper capita the coefﬁcient on skill abundancedrops
from 0.095 and 0.057. Due to the correlation withGDP per capita, the coefﬁcient
becomes lower onceGDPper capita is also included.Our estimation results imply
that a 10% increase in relative skill abundance is associated with an increase in
traded goods prices of between 0.9% and 0.6%. We ﬁnd that prices increase with
distance supporting theWashington apples effect. Furthermore, GDP per capita
9 See cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci/baciwp.pdf.
10 See cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. The distance data are calculated following the great
circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the relevant capital cities.
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of the exporter country has a positive effect on export unit values throughout all
speciﬁcations with a coefﬁcient between 0. 19 and 0. 15.
To check for nonlinearities, we add nonlinear terms (squares and interaction
terms) in column (3) with the marginal effects displayed in column (4). The in-
teraction term between skill abundance ln SU and GDP per capita is signiﬁcant,
implying that some of the effects are nonlinear. The marginal effects are very
close to the coefﬁcients of the linear speciﬁcation.
In column (5), we use sector and importer-country speciﬁc estimates of the
product substitution elasticity estimated by Broda et al. (2006) to examine the
interaction effect of skill abundance in exporter countries with the product sub-
stitution elasticity in importer countries.11 Broda et al. (2006) estimate the sub-
stitution elasticities for 73 countries at the HS6 level.12 The coefﬁcient of the
interaction term is negative and non-signiﬁcant.13 Below, we will show that
effects are similar in the simulations with our theoretical model displaying a
very small effect of the substitution elasticity on the impact of skill abundance
on traded goods prices.
Finally, we evaluate the importance of exporting ﬁxed costs and the extensive
margin for traded goods prices. Columns (6) and (7) show that measures of both
variables are insigniﬁcant. As will be discussed below this is in line with simula-
tions with the theoretical model, where these variables are also insigniﬁcant.14
To summarize, our estimation results indicate that countries export higher
priced, higher quality products when they are more skill abundant. They thus
show that the results of Schott (2004) also hold when we take a wider sample of
importing countries beyond the US, although the impact of relative skill abun-
dance is a bit lower for the larger sample of importing countries (see the online
appendix for further discussion on the comparison between Schott (2004) and
our results).
3. Theoretical model
The modelling setup follows Venables (1994), adding endogenous quality and
non-homothetic factor cost bundles. We model an economy with two countries
indexed by k, l =H,F, two factors of production, skilled workers S and unskilled
workers U . All workers in the two countries have identical preferences.
11 We cannot include the measure itself as we have sectoral ﬁxed effects.
12 The data can be downloaded from columbia.edu/∼dew35/TradeElasticities/TradeElasticities.
html
13 We also explored the interaction effect with ¾ in the nonlinear model and effects are very similar.
Results are available upon request.
14 Controlling also for GDP per capita, the extensive margin measure becomes signiﬁcant with a
positive sign. This result is hard to interpret, and so we conclude that the effect of the extensive
margin is not robust to variation in control variables.
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3.1. Demand
Utility in country k, Qk , consists of a CES composite of domestic varieties Qkk
and foreign varieties Qlk with substitution elasticity ". Preferences for both do-
mestic and foreign varieties are a CES function over a continuum of varieties
!∈Äkk and !∈Älk with substitution elasticity ¾:
Qk = (Q
"−1
"
kk +Q
"−1
"
lk )
"
"−1 , (1)
Qlk =
⎡
⎢⎣ ∫
!∈Älk
(z(!)q(!))
¾−1
¾ d!
⎤
⎥⎦
¾
¾−1
. (2)
q! and z! are, respectively, the quantity and quality of variety !. Variables with
a subscript lk represent ﬂows from country l to country k. Demand for variety
! by all consumers in country k imported from country l is given by:
qlk(!)= zlk(!)¾−1plk(!)−¾P¾−"lk P"−1k Ik . (3)
The price index Pk and Plk are deﬁned as:
Pk =
(
P1−"kk +P1−"lk
) 1
1−" (4)
Plk =
⎡
⎢⎣ ∫
!∈Älk
(
p(!)
z(!)
)1−¾
d!
⎤
⎥⎦
1
1−¾
. (5)
Ik is total income in country k and the sum of skilled and unskilled labour’s
income:
Ik =wskSk +wukUk . (6)
wsk and w
u
k are, respectively, the wages of skilled and unskilled workers and Sk
and Uk the number of skilled and unskilled workers.
3.2. Supply
We now turn to the supply side. Like in Krugman (1980) ﬁrms are identical and
can produce with an identical increasing returns technology with a ﬁxed cost
f. Following Venables (1994) ﬁrms have to pay market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs.15 So
a ﬁrm from country k pays domestic ﬁxed costs to sell in its home market, fkk
and additional exporting ﬁxed costs fkl to sell abroad. We can interpret the ﬁxed
costs as beachhead costs to enter a market. Beachhead costs for each market are
intuitive in a setting where ﬁrms produce different quality levels for different des-
tinationmarkets depending onmarket conditions in the destination.Destination-
speciﬁc ﬁxed costs also enable us to derive analytical results in the basic model.
15 Jean (2002) and Melitz (2003) also work with ﬁxed export costs.
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As explained by Venables (1994) a setup with an upper Armington nest together
with destination-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs implies selection into exporting with only a
subset of ﬁrms exporting.Without the Armington nest, the four free entry condi-
tions (two for each country) following from destination-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs would
not be independent and thus not allow for both trading and non-trading ﬁrms.
Selection is a property of our model setup, but is not important for the results on
traded goods prices in the basic model as ﬁrms are homogeneous and per unit
trade costs are absent. In the extendedmodel with per unit trade costs, changes in
the number of exporting ﬁrms (the extensive margin) might affect traded goods
prices, since per unit trade costs imply that exported goods are of higher quality.
Marginal costs for sales to a speciﬁc destination (domestic and exporting) are
a function of the quality of the good sold in the destination with an elasticity
1=μ. μ is called the quality elasticity in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and it is a
measure for the ability to produce high-quality goods.16 Feenstra and Romalis
(2014) also work with this relation between quality and marginal costs. The total
cost function Ck of a ﬁrm from country k is given by:
Ck
(
zkk , zkl ,wks,wku
)= ∑
l=H ,F
(
z
1
μ
kl¿klqkl + fkl
)
CBkl . (7)
¿kl are iceberg trade costs. CBkl is the cost of input bundles used in production
and ﬁxed costs and deﬁned as follows:
CBkl =CB
(
zkl ,wks,wku
)=((z´klwsk)1−½ +# (wuk)1−½) 11−½ . (8)
We assume ´>0. The expression for the cost of input bundles in (8) implies that
an increase in quality raises the weight of skilled workers in the input bundle.
Therefore, relatively more high skilled workers are required for higher quality
goods. So, the cost function is non-homothetic and to allow for variation in
the substitution elasticity between high skilled and low skilled workers, we work
with a non-homothetic CES cost function as in Shimomura (1999) with ½ the
substitution elasticity between skilled and unskilled labour in the cost of input
bundles in (8).17 # is a CES-shifter used in the calibration to generate a positive
skill-premium, i.e. wsk >w
u
k .
We choose the functional form z´kl for the CES-weight to be able to derive ana-
lytical results on the effects of skill abundance on quality and traded goods prices
in the baseline model. With our speciﬁcation costs depend on quality through
marginal costs and through the non-homotheticity of the input bundles.
Using the expression for demand in equation (3) and the cost function as
speciﬁed in equation (7), each ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts ¼k choosing the price pkl
and quality zkl :
16 To be precise, the quality elasticity as deﬁned in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) is equal to μ −1 in
our model.
17 The production function corresponding to the cost function CB in equation (8) is given by
Y (zkm,Uk , Sk)=
((
Sk
z´km
) ½−1
½
+# 1½ U
½−1
½
k
) ½
½−1
.
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¼k =
∑
l=H ,F
((
pkl
zkl
)1−¾
P¾−"kl P
"
l Il −
(
z
1
μ +¾−1
kl ¿klp
−¾
kl P
¾−"
kl P
"
l Il + fkl
)
CBkl
)
. (9)
Each ﬁrm produces a unique variety.Maximizing proﬁts with respect to the price
pkl generates the following markup equation for the CIF price:
pkl =
¾
¾ −1z
1
μ
kl¿klCBkl . (10)
Taking the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt in equation (9) with respect to quality
and substituting the markup pricing equation in (10) leads to:
pklqkl
¾
((
¾ −1) μ−1
μ
zkl
+ ¾ −1
CB
@CB
@zkl
)
+ fkl
@CB
@zkl
=0. (11)
The domestic and exporting market can be seen as separate markets, because
there are ﬁxed exporting costs besides regular ﬁxed costs. Entering the domestic
market and paying the domestic beachhead cost does not imply that a ﬁrm can
also export as in Krugman (1980). This implies that there are two separate zero
proﬁt conditions, one for thedomesticmarket andone for the exportingmarket:18
pklqkl
¾
= fklCBkl . (12)
The derivative of CBkl in equation (8) with respect to zkl is equal to:
@CBkl
@zkl
= ´CB
½
kl
(
z´klw
s
k
)1−½
zkl
. (13)
Substituting the zero proﬁt conditions in equations (12) and the expression for
@CB
@zkl
into equation (11) leads to:
(
¾ −1) μ−1
μ
zkl
− ¾´
(
z´klw
s
k
)1−½
zklCB
1−½
kl
=0. (14)
The ﬁrst term in equation (14) represents the balance of the marginal beneﬁt of
higher quality as a result of larger sales and the increase inmarginal cost of higher
quality. The second term represents the marginal cost of higher quality due to a
larger required use of the more expensive skilled labour. The balance of the two
determines the optimal level of quality.
Using the expression for CBkl in equation (8), equation (14) can be rewritten
to express the relative wage
wsk
wuk
as a function of quality zkl with ³ deﬁned as
³ = ¾−1
¾
μ−1
μ
1
´
:
18 Venables (1994) works with one free entry condition for ﬁrms selling only in the domestic
market and one free entry condition for ﬁrms selling in both markets. This is equivalent to our
approach with a free entry condition for each market.
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wuk
wsk
= z´kl
(
1− ³
³
) 1
1−½
. (15)
3.3. Effect of skill abundance
To derive the effect of skill abundance on quality, we add the labour market
equilibrium conditions for skilled and unskilled workers. Applying Shephard’s
lemma to the cost function in equation (7) and using the rewritten free entry
conditions, z
1
μ
klqkl + fkl =¾fkl , gives:
Sk =
∑
l=H ,F
Nkl¾fklCB
½
kl
(
z´kl
)1−½ (wsk)−½, (16)
Uk =
∑
l=H ,F
Nkl¾fklCB
½
kl#
(
wuk
)−½. (17)
We can divide the labour market conditions in equations (16)–(17), using the
fact that quality zkl does not vary with the destination market without per unit
trade costs and a role for importer GDP per capita. This leads to the following
expression:
Sk
Uk
=
(
z´kl
)1−½
#
(
wuk
wsk
)½
. (18)
Substituting equation (15) into (18), we can solve for quality zkl as a function of
relative skill abundance Sk=Uk :
zkl =
(
1
#
Sk
Uk
) 1
´
(
³
1− ³
) 1
´
½
1−½
. (19)
So, quality zkl rises in relative skill abundance
Sk
Uk
.
We can easily determine the effect of relative skill abundance on the export
price. From equation (10) the export price pkl is determined by the level of quality
zkl and the cost of input bundles CBkl :
pkl =
¾
¾ −1
(
Sk
Uk
) 1
´μ
(
³
1− ³
) ½
´(1−½)μ
¿klCBkl . (20)
In the online appendix, we show that the relative change of unit wage costs as a
result of a change in the relative wage
wsk
wuk
is zero when taking into account the
endogenous reaction in quality. The direct effect of a larger relative skilled wage
wsk
wuk
exactly cancels out against the effect of the reduction in quality induced by a
larger relative skilled wage. So the costs of input bundles do not vary with relative
wages. Hence, the effect of relative skill abundance is determined by the direct
effect in equation (20) displaying an elasticity of the price pkl with respect to skill
abundance of 1
´μ
. So, we have the following result:
Result 1 In the baseline model, export goods from relatively more skill abundant
countries have a larger quality and a higher price.
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The model presented in this section contains a link between skill abundance,
quality and market price. In a more skill abundant country, the relative wage of
skilled workers is lower. Therefore, the marginal cost of producing higher quality
goods falls. As a result ﬁrms will offer higher quality goods.19 The relations are
consistent with the empirical ﬁndings by Schott (2004). A larger relative skill
abundance in an exporting country leads to a higher export quality and a higher
export price.
3.4. Model with extensions
In this section, we add two additional features to the baseline skill abundance
model, a taste for quality that is varying with income as in Hallak (2006) and
per unit trade costs as in Hummels and Skiba (2004). With these extensions our
model becomes close to the model in Feenstra and Romalis (2014) with twomain
differences. First, we extend the model with a role for skill abundance; second,
we limit the model by abstracting from ﬁrm heterogeneity and instead working
with destination-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs as in Venables (1994). Firm heterogeneity is
not important for our paper since we focus on aggregate traded goods prices and
not on ﬁrm-level prices. Moreover, since we cannot solve for quality explicitly
with our extensions, ﬁrm heterogeneity would make simulations intractable.
The ﬁrst additional feature is introduced as in Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
using the dual approach starting from the expenditure function. The expenditure
function Evk of a worker of type v, v= s, u, is deﬁned as:
Evk =QvkPvk =Qvk
(
K∑
l=1
(
Pvlk
)1−") 11−", (21)
Pvlk =
⎡
⎢⎣ ∫
!∈Älk
(
p(!)
z(!)®
v
k
)1−¾
d!
⎤
⎥⎦
1
1−¾
. (22)
K is the number of countries, not necessarily limited to 2. ®vk measures the im-
portance of quality for consumers in country k and ®vk is a function of utility of
a worker of type v in country k, Qvk :
®vk =1+¸ lnQvk . (23)
The expenditure function differs across the two types of workers, since the im-
portance of quality for consumers is a function of utility. Demand qlk(!) is the
sum of demands of the two types of workers and follows from the expenditure
function in (21) and (22):
19 Scope for quality differentiation implies that, in our model, larger relative skill abundance and
thus relatively lower skilled wages lead to higher prices. This in contrast to the standard
Heckscher–Ohlin factor abundance model, where larger skill abundance and thus lower skilled
wages lead to lower prices.
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qlk(!)=
∑
v=s,u
qvlk(!)=plk(!)−¾
∑
v=s,u
zlk(!)
®vk(¾−1)
(
Pvlk
)¾−" (Pvk)"Qvk . (24)
Price plk and quality zlk are the same for the two types of workers, since we
assume that the ﬁxed costs involved in developing a new variety are sufﬁciently
large to make it unproﬁtable to sell the different types of workers goods with
different quality levels.
The second extension to the baseline model consists of the inclusion of both
iceberg trade costs ¿kl and per unit trade costs Tkl . Per unit trade costs will
generate a Washington apples effect that exported goods are of higher quality.
The expression for total costs of a ﬁrm from country k becomes:
Ck
(
zkk , zkl ,w
s
k ,w
u
k
)= K∑
l=1
(
¿kl
(
z
1
μ
kl
CBkl
'k
+Tkl
)
qkl +
CBkl
'k
fkl
)
. (25)
Following Feenstra and Romalis (2014), iceberg trade costs are paid over costs
inclusive of per unit trade costs. 'k is a country-level productivity measure, trans-
forming the number of skilled Sk and unskilled workers Uk into the effective
number of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively S˜k and U˜k :
S˜k ='kSk ; U˜k ='kUk . (26)
The productivity term 'k is introduced to be able to calibrate income per capita
to a desired level.
Employing the expression for CBkl in equation (8) and the free entry condi-
tion, pklqkl = ¾fklCBkl'k , proﬁt maximization generates the following markup pric-
ing equation and ﬁrst order condition for quality:20
pkl =
¾
¾ −1¿kl
(
z
1
μ
kl
CBkl
'k
+Tkl
)
, (27)
∑
v=s,u
Âvkl®
v
l
(
z
1
μ
kl
CBkl
'k
+Tkl
)
− 1
μ
z
1
μ
kl
CBkl
'k
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
¾
CBkl
'k
z
1
μ
kl +Tkl
¾ −1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠´
(
z´klw
s
k
)1−½
CB1−½kl
=0.
(28)
With the share of spending by workers of type v= s, u in country l on goods from
country k, Âvkl , given by:
Âvkl =
pklqvkl
pklqkl
= z
®vl (¾−1)
kl
(
Pvkl
)¾−" (Pvl )" Qvl∑
w=s,u
z
®wl (¾−1)
kl
(
Pwkl
)¾−" (Pwl )" Qvl . (29)
The ﬁrst term in equation (28) is the marginal beneﬁt of higher quality as a result
of larger sales. The second term represents the direct marginal cost of higher
20 Derivation in the online appendix. Because of the two income groups, we cannot work with
quality-adjusted price and quantity as in Feenstra and Romalis (2014) to derive the ﬁrst order
condition.
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quality and the third term represents the marginal cost of higher quality due to
a larger required use of the more expensive skilled labour both in variable costs
and ﬁxed costs. The balance of the three terms determines the optimal level of
quality.
The FOC for quality zkl nests both our baseline model and the model in
Romalis (2014). Setting ®vl at 1 and Tkl at 0, the FOC in equation (28) will be
identical to the FOC in the baseline model. Setting ´ at zero and thus eliminating
the third term in equation (28) and equating ®vl across the two income groups,
®vl = ®l , leads to the same (explicit) solution for quality zkl as in Feenstra and
Romalis (2014), z
1
μ
kl = μ®lTkl1−μ®k
'k
CBkl
.21
The inclusion of the productivity shifter 'k and per unit trade costsTkl implies
that the expressions for labour market equilibrium become:
Sk =
K∑
l=1
Nkl
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
¾
CBkl
'k
z
1
μ
kl +Tkl
CBkl
'k
z
1
μ
kl +Tkl
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ fkl'k CB½kl
(
z´kl
)1−½ (wsk)−½, (30)
Uk =
K∑
l=1
Nkl
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
¾
CBkl
'k
z
1
μ
kl +Tkl
CBkl
'k
z
1
μ
kl +Tkl
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ fkl'k CB½kl#
(
wuk
)−½ . (31)
To complete the characterization of equilibrium, we need to determine the
number of domestic and exporting ﬁrms in each country, respectively Nkk and
Nkl , for which we use two equations. First, the expenditures to factor payments
can be expressed as follows:
K∑
l=1
Nkl
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
¾z
1
μ
kl
CBkl
'k
+Tkl
z
1
μ
kl
CBkl
'k
+Tkl
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ fkl CBkl'k =wukUk +wskSk . (32)
Second, following Venables (1994), we combine the free entry condition, the
expression for the price index and the markup pricing rule to express the share
of exporting ﬁrms as follows:
(
Nkk
Nlk
) ¾−"
¾−1 =
CBlk
'l
CBkk
'k
flk
fkk
∑
v=s,u
z
®vk("−1)
kk
(
Pvk
)" Qvk
∑
v=s,u
z
®vk("−1)
lk
(
Pvk
)" Qvk
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
¿lk
(
z
1
μ
lk
CBlk
'l
+Tlk
)
¿kk
(
z
1
μ
kk
CBkk
'k
+Tkk
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
"−1
. (33)
21 An explicit expression for zkl is indispensable to solve the model under ﬁrm heterogeneity, also
when using numerics. The reason is that the free entry condition is expressed as an integral over
all active ﬁrms. Feenstra and Romalis (2014) do not solve for all endogenous variables in the
model and leave the free entry condition aside. Moreover, they can solve explicitly for zkl as there
is no role for factor abundance. To be able to solve and simulate the model, we thus have to work
with identical ﬁrms.
16 E. Bekkers, J. Francois and M. Manchin
We can now deﬁne equilibrium as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Equilibrium in the model is deﬁned by a tuple of vectors in all coun-
tries k for all workers v, {wvk ,®vk ,Qvk ,Evk ,Pvk}, in all pairs of countries k and l,{zkl ,CBkl ,Nkl} and in all pairs of countries k and l for all workers v, {Pvkl} and is
determined by the following equations in all countries k:
1. The expression for the cost of input bundles in equation (8) to each destination
market l
2. The expression for expenditure in equation (21)
3. The expression for the price index in equation (22)
4. The expression for the quality elasticity with respect to utility in equation (23)
5. The markup pricing rule in equation (27) to each destination market l
6. The FOC for quality in equation (28) to each destination market l
7. Labour market equilibrium for skilled and unskilled workers in equations (30)
and (31)
8. The income identity in equation (32)
9. The expression for the share of exporting ﬁrms in equation (33)
4. Numerical analysis of the theoretical model
In this section, we numerically solve the extended model with multiple countries
as deﬁned in deﬁnition 1 to explore the effect of distance on the skill premium
through quality specialization.22 We simulate the model with ﬁve countries with
values for the exogenous variables equal to the values for the largest ﬁve countries
in our empirical exercise in terms of GDP.
In the simulations, we concentrate on the FOBprice, as our traded goods price
data are also FOB prices. The FOB price can be expressed as a function of the
CIF price as follows:
pFOBkl =
pcifkl
¿kl
−Tkl . (34)
We start in the next subsection with a discussion of model calibration. In
the following subsections, we present simulation results on the role of the exten-
sive margin and the effect of distance on the skill premium. We close this sec-
tion with robustness checks of the simulation results to variations in parameter
values.
4.1. Calibration
Table 2 displays the parameter values used in the simulations with the extended
model, their description and their source.Model parameters and exogenous vari-
ables are on the one hand taken from the literature and the data (section 4.1.1)
22 The GAMS code of the numerical models is available upon request.
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TABLE 2
Baseline values of parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
¾ 6.07 Substitution elasticity between varieties
on product market
Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
¸ 0.021 Elasticity of taste for quality parameter
with respect to income/capita
Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
μ 0.61 Elasticity of marginal costs with respect
to quality
Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
· 0.1 Elasticity of per unit trade costs wrt
distance
Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
" 1.2 Armington substitution elasticity on
the product market
Feenstra et al. (2014)
½ 1.2 Substitution elasticity between skilled
and unskilled labour
Hertel et al. (2012)
fkk 1 Fixed costs of production
fkl 1 Exporting ﬁxed costs
dkl Data Distance between countries Clair et al. (2004)
Sk
Uk
Data Relative skill abundance WDI
Uk Data Number of unskilled workers WDI
'k Data Productivity WDI
# 0.14 CES-shifter low-skilled labour Acemoglu (2003)
´ 0.79 Elasticity of skilled factor intensity with
respect to quality
Simulations
± 0.05 Elasticity of ad valorem trade costs with
respect to distance
Simulations
and on the other hand calibrated to match the regression results with real-world
data (section 4.1.2).
4.1.1. Parameters and data from the literature
Weselect parameters anddata fromfourdifferent sources.First, for all parameters
also appearing in Feenstra and Romalis (2014), we use the values estimated by
these scholars. So, the substitution elasticity ¾ between varieties is set at 6.07;
the elasticity of the taste for quality parameter with respect to income per capita,
¸, is set at 0.021; the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to quality, μ, is set
equal to 0.61; and the elasticity of per unit trade costs with respect to distance is
equal to 0.1.
Second, for some parameters speciﬁc to our model and not appearing in Feen-
stra andRomalis (2014), we select values from the literature. TheArmington sub-
stitution elasticity " is taken fromFeenstra et al. (2014) who come to estimates for
the substitution elasticity between domestic and foreign varieties (the “macro”
elasticity) around 1. We choose a value of 1.2 to avoid convergence problems
appearing for values of " close to 1. The substitution elasticity between factor
inputs not taking into account quality changes is set at 1.2, corresponding with
the median value across sectors in Hertel et al. (2012). Fixed production costs fkk
are set at 1. Bernard et al. (2007) work with an equally arbitrary value of 0.1 in
their simulations, motivating this value with the fact that 0.1 is 5% of their value
18 E. Bekkers, J. Francois and M. Manchin
for sunk entry costs. Given that we do not have sunk entry costs, we can choose
a value of 1 for ﬁxed costs without loss of generality. Following Bernard et al.
(2007) exporter ﬁxed costs are set equal to domestic ﬁxed costs, so that without
per unit and ad valorem trade costs selling at home and abroad would be equally
attractive.
Third, values for distance dkl and skill abundance
Sk
Uk
are set equal to the val-
ues in the dataset used for the empirics, using data of the largest ﬁve countries in
terms of GDP. Domestic distance is set equal to internal distance as reported in
Clair et al. (2004). The trade literature works increasingly with positive domestic
trade costs, see, for example, Ramondo et al. (2014). Fourth, the number of un-
skilled workers Uk and productivity 'k are determined endogenously, imposing
that income and income per capita are equal to the dataset-values used in the
empirics.23 In a similar way the CES-shifter on low-skilled labour, #, was set at
0.14 in order to generate an average skill premium of 1.6, corresponding with a
log skill premium of 0.47 reported in Acemoglu (2003).
4.1.2. Calibrated parameters
We calibrate the elasticity of skilled factor intensity with respect to quality, ´,
and the elasticity of iceberg trade costs with respect to distance, ±, such that
the estimated elasticities of the FOB price with respect to skill abundance and
distance employing data following from model simulations are close to the elas-
ticities estimated with real-world data. In the simulations both distance dkl and
skill abundance SkUk are varied randomly three times each around their respective
dataset-values dkl and
Sk
Uk
, using dkl = dkl (1+ uniform(−0.01, 0.01)) and SkUk =
( SkUk 1+uniform(−0.01, 0.01)). For each of the nine variations the model is solved
thus mimicking variation over time in these variables. Log-FOB-prices follow-
ing from the simulation outcomes are then regressed on log-skill-abundance and
log-distance including as in the empirical analysis combined ﬁxed effects for each
importer-loop pair. This procedure is repeated 200 times.24
Table 3 displays the average estimated coefﬁcients and standard errors of the
regressions with the simulated data, setting ´ at 0.79 and ± at 0.05.2526 The table
shows that the estimated elasticities following from the model simulations are
close to the empirically estimated elasticities of 0.095 and 0.094 for skill abun-
dance and 0.116 and 0.127 for distance in respectively the linear and nonlinear
speciﬁcation. The average standard error shows that the coefﬁcients are very
23 Income Ik is deﬁned as Ik =wksSk +wkuUk and income per capita ik as ik = wksSk+wkuUkSk+Uk .
24 In all the simulations, we check the SOC deﬁned in the online appendix. It is satisﬁed for all
simulations.
25 In searching for ± and ´, ± was limited between 0 and 0.1, as the elasticity of ad valorem trade
costs with respect to distance should be smaller than the elasticity of per unit trade costs with
respect to distance to generate a Washington apples effect.
26 Both per unit and ad valorem trade costs are only a function of distance with, respectively,
elasticities of ±=0.05 and ´=0.1.
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TABLE 3
Estimated elasticities of FOB prices with respect to skill
abundance and distance with simulated data
Variable Average Average
coefﬁcient standard
error
Skill abundance SkUk 0.0925 0.00546
(0.0254) (0.00126)
Distance dkl 0.121 0.00143
(0.00759) (0.000332)
NOTES: The table displays the average coefﬁcient and
the average standard error of 200 importer ﬁxed effects
regressions of the FOB price on skill abundance and
distance, all measured in logs. Standard errors of the
200 repetitions in parentheses.
signiﬁcant and the standard errors of the simulations between brackets show that
the estimated coefﬁcients do not vary much over the different iterations.
4.2. The role of the extensive margin
This subsection explores the effect of the extensivemargin on traded goods prices.
There is selection into exporting in our model, as only a fraction of all ﬁrms ex-
port. The fraction of ﬁrms exporting is likely to exert an effect on export-quality
and thus on export prices. If a larger fraction of ﬁrms exports, demand for high
skilled workers will go up, since exported goods are of higher quality and thus
require more high skilled workers. We evaluate the effect of the extensive margin
on FOB prices with our numerical model randomly varying ﬁxed export costs
relative to ﬁxed domestic costs. Column 1 of table 4 displays the outcomes of re-
gressing FOB prices on the extensive margin, deﬁned as the fraction of exporting
ﬁrms relative to domestic ﬁrms, averaged over all export destinations. Skill abun-
dance and distance are also included as regressors and the estimation is repeated
200 times. The table shows that the extensive margin has on average a small neg-
ative impact on FOB prices. Still, the standard error of the average coefﬁcient
between parentheses is large, indicating that the coefﬁcient varies hugely over
the 200 iterations. Therefore, we can conclude that the extensive margin does not
have a signiﬁcant impact on traded goods prices in our model. In column 2, we
also examine the effect of exporting ﬁxed costs relative to domestic ﬁxed costs.
Also this variable does not have a signiﬁcant impact on traded goods prices.
4.3. Effect of distance on the skill premium
In this subsection, we study the effect of distance on the skill premium. There is
both a supply-side and demand-side effect. Since distance has a stronger effect
on per unit than on ad valorem trade costs, an increase in distance makes the
Washington apples effect stronger. Therefore ﬁrms raise the quality of exported
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TABLE 4
Estimated elasticities of FOB prices with respect to the extensive margin and
ﬁxed export costs
Variable Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg.
coefﬁcient standard coefﬁcient standard
error error
Skill abundance SkUk 0.0922 0.00562 0.0930 0.00528
(0.0376) (0.00252) (0.0237) (0.00120)
Distance dkl 0.123 0.00117 0.122 0.00138
(0.00120) (0.000412) (0.0678) (0.000316)
Extensive margin emk −0.00465 0.00541
(0.0534) (0.00527)
Export ﬁxed costs fklfkk −0.0304 0.401
(0.700) (0.0983)
NOTES: The table displays the average coefﬁcient and the average standard
error of 200 ﬁxed effects regressions of the FOB price on skill abundance,
distance and the extensive margin, all measured in logs. The extensive margin
is deﬁned as the share of exporting ﬁrms relative to domestic ﬁrms. Export
ﬁxed costs is deﬁned as export ﬁxed costs divided by domestic ﬁxed costs, both
averaged over all trading partners. Standard errors of the 200 repetitions in
parentheses
goods. As a result the relative demand for skilled labour rises and therefore the
nominal skill premium, representing the supply-side effect. Since quality is more
important for higher income high-skilled workers, the increase in quality leads
to a stronger decrease in the quality adjusted price index for the high-skilled, a
demand side effect. In table 5, we display the estimated elasticities of the skill
premium with respect to skill abundance and average distance of each country
vis-a`-vis all its trading partners employing the outcomes of model simulations
repeated 200 times based on the baseline parameter values.We display the average
elasticity of the nominal skill premium, w
s
wu , reﬂecting the supply-side effect, of
the quality-adjusted price ratio, P
u
Ps , reﬂecting the demand-side effect, and of real
skill premium, w
s
Ps =
wu
Pu , reﬂecting the overall effect. The table shows that distance
has a signiﬁcant, positive effect on the nominal skill premium, with an elasticity
of about 0.023, which means that a doubling of distance of a country vis-a`-vis
all its trading partners will raise its skill premium by 1.6% (20.023 −1).27 So, our
ﬁnding provides support for the supply-side effect just described. There are two
reasons for the relatively modest effect of distance on the skill premium. First,
domestic quality will be adjusted downwards in response to an increase in the
relative price of skilled labour. This adjustment limits the initial effect on the skill
premium. Second, an increase in distance raises both per unit and ad valorem
trade costs, reducing the share of production for the export market and thus
reducing the share of goods with high quality.
The table also shows that the quality-adjusted price ratio of low-skilled to high-
skilled rises signiﬁcantly with distance, although the effect is an order smaller
27 Skill abundance has a strong negative effect on the skill premium, as expected.
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TABLE 5
Estimated elasticities of skill premium with respect to skill abundance and distance with simulated
data
Variable w
s
wu SE
pu
ps SE
ws
Ps =
wu
Pu SE
Skill abundance SkUk −0.797 0.00507 0.000873 0.000437 −0.797 0.00507
(0.00318) (0.000508) (0.0000114) (0.0000112) (0.00300) (0.000575)
Distance dkl 0.0233 0.00506 0.0000362 0.0000114 0.0234 0.00505
(0.0100) (0.000571) (0.0000146) (0.0000112) (0.0100) (0.000571)
NOTES: The table displays the average coefﬁcient and the average standard error of 200 regressions of
the nominal skill premium w
s
wu and the price ratio
pu
ps on skill abundance and average distance of each
country vis-a`-vis all its trading partners, all measured in logs. Standard errors of the 200 repetitions
in parentheses.
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FIGURE 1 Partial scatter plot of skill premium on distance
than the supply-side effect on the nominal skill premium. This ﬁnding provides
support for the demand-side effect: a larger distance raises theWashington apples
effect, which in turn raises quality beneﬁting high-skilled workers more than low-
skilled workers. The elasticity of the real skill premium with respect to distance
in column 5 is the sum of the elasticities of the nominal skill premium and the
price ratio.
Figure 1 shows the partial scatter plot of the skill premium on distance (both
measured in logs) following from the partial regression of the skill premium on
distance with skill abundance as control variable and importer-repetition ﬁxed
effects. The ﬁgure shows ﬁve sets of scattered points corresponding with obser-
vations in the ﬁve different countries. The scatter plot shows clearly that there is
a positive relation in the model between distance and the skill premium.
A reduction of ad valorem trade costs works in the model like an increase
in distance, as the elasticity of ad valorem trade costs with respect to distance
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is smaller than the elasticity of per unit trade costs with respect to distance. So
with lower ad valorem trade costs theWashington apples effect becomes stronger
raising the skill premium. We summarize the above discussion as follows:
Observation 1 In the model with per unit and ad valorem trade costs and demand
for quality varying with income, a reduction in distance raises the real skill premium
through a strengthening of the Washington apples effect.
We perform two additional exercises to get more insight into the effect of
trade costs and distance on the skill premium. First, we compare the average
skill premium in all countries in a situation with actual distance between trading
partners and a situation with distance between trading partners set equal to
average domestic distance of the ﬁve countries. This exercise thus shows what the
effect is of neutralizing distance between all trading partners. Increasing distance
between trading partners from the domestic level to the actual level leads as
expected to an increase in the average skill premium in all countries from 1.31 to
1.66 and the difference is highly signiﬁcant. Increasing distance for sales in other
countries raises the quality of goods sold because of theWashington apples effect
and this drives up the relative demand for skilled workers.
Second, we simulate the model two times, ﬁrst switching off the supply-side
mechanism and then the demand-side mechanism by ﬁrst setting ´ at zero and
then setting ¸ at zero. The Washington apples effect creates an effect of distance
both through the demand-side as a result of non-homothetic preferences with
higher income agents demanding higher quality goods and through the supply-
side as a result of non-homothetic technology with quality being skill intensive.
We thus assess the relative contribution of demand-side and supply-side forces
by switching off, respectively, non-homothetic technology and non-homothetic
preferences. Table 6 displays the results. The results are as expected. If we set
´ at zero, the effect of distance on the nominal skill premium becomes zero
and the supply-side effect disappears. With ´ equal to zero, skill intensity of
production is not related to quality and hence the increasing quality as a result of
the Washington apples effect does not affect the skill premium. Instead the small
demand-side effect on the price ratio remains in place. If instead we set ¸ at zero,
the effect of distance on the price ratio becomes zero and the demand-side effect
disappears. The quality-adjusted price is the same for both income groups with
¸ equal to zero and henceforth the Washington apples effect has no differential
impact on the quality-adjusted prices of the two income groups. The supply-side
effect on the nominal skill premium instead remains in place.
4.4. Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our simulations, we evaluate the effect of variation in
the parameters ¾, ¸, μ, ·, ", fkl , fkl=fkk , ´ and ± on the estimated elasticities of both
FOB prices and the skill premium with respect to distance and skill abundance.
We vary these parameters one at a time. Table 7 shows how the elasticities vary
with theparameter values.The secondcolumnshows theminimumandmaximum
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TABLE 6
Estimated elasticities of skill premium with respect to skill abundance and distance with simulated
data with ´=0 and ¸=0
Variable w
s
wu SE
pu
ps SE
ws
Ps =
wu
Pu SE
´=0
Skill abundance SkUk −0.833 5. 42e−07 −4.51e−06 0.0000113 −0.833 0.0000116
(2.44e−06) (3.04e−06) (0.000148) (3.51e−07) (0.000148) (2.05e−06)
Distance dkl 9.05e−07 5.39e−07 0.0000943 0.0000112 0.0000953 0.0000116
(5.42e−06) (3.02e−06) (1.14e−06) (3.57e−07) (5.65e−06) (2.04e−06)
¸=0
Skill abundance SkUk −0.797 0.00521 6.90e−14 8.46e−14 −0.797 0.00521
(0.00440) (0.000744) (4.88e−13) (5.98e−13) (0.00440) (0.000744)
Distance dkl 0.0238 0.00519 −1.51e−13 8.44e−14 0.0238 0.00519
(0.00914) (0.000741) (1.07e−12) (5.97e−13) (0.00914) (0.000741)
NOTES: The table displays the average coefﬁcient and the average standard error of 50 regressions
of the nominal skill premium w
s
wu and the price ratio
pu
ps on skill abundance and average distance of
each country vis-a`-vis all its trading partners, all measured in logs, for, respectively, ´=0 and ¸=0.
Standard errors of the 50 repetitions in parentheses.
TABLE 7
Simulated elasticities of the traded goods price with respect to distance, skill abundance and exporter
GDP per capita and of the skill premium with respect to distance
Parameter Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
Parameter values px wrt S=U px wrt distance ws=wu wrt distance
Min. Base Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max.
¾ 3.05 6.07 6.2 0.0258 0.0925 0.121 0.141 0.0208 0.0233
¸ 0.01 0.021 0.05 0.0864 0.0979 0.121 0.124 0.0231 0.0259
μ 0.4 0.61 0.7 0.0212 0.122 0.119 0.136 0.0140 0.0257
· 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.0641 0.123 0.0871 0.265 0.0199 0.0255
" 1.2 1.2 1.8 0.0647 0.089 0.123 0.138 0.0232 0.0301
fkl 0.5 1 2.5 0.0765 0.0925 0.121 0.127 0.0233 0.0246
fkl
fkk
1 1 2.25 0.0876 0.0954 0.121 0.123 0.0234 0.0220
´ 0.6 0.8 1.4 0.112 0.643 0.117 0.121 0.0233 0.0337
± 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.0671 0.0925 0.0943 0.124 0.0227 0.0241
value of the different parameters in the robustness checks and for comparison the
baseline value. The next two columns show the elasticities of the FOB price with
respect to distance and skill abundance corresponding with the maximum and
minimum parameter values. The last column displays the elasticities of the real
skill premiumwith respect to distance for theminimumandmaximumparameter
values. The reported elasticities are averages based upon 50 repetitions with the
reported parameter values.
We canmake the following ﬁve observations on the robustness exercises. First,
signs of the three elasticities of the export price with respect to skill abundance
and distance and of the elasticity of the skill premium with respect to distance
always stay the same. Second, the parameters ¸, fklfkk and fkl have only a relatively
small impact on the elasticities. So, although the level of ﬁxed costs was set
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somewhat arbitrary this has almost no effect on the model outcomes. Third,
the elasticity of the skill premium with respect to distance, reported in the last
columns of 7, always stays positive but also relatively small.28 Fourth, the effect
of the substitution elasticity ¾ on the elasticity of the export price with respect
to skill abundance is positive but small. The sign of this interaction effect is
hence opposite to what we ﬁnd in the empirics, but like in the empirics where
the effect is non-signiﬁcant, the effect is small. Fifth and ﬁnally, the parameters
with a relatively strong impact on the elasticity of the export price with respect
to skill abundance are μ and ´. We interpret the inﬂuence of these parameters
on the elasticities as follows. μ is an inverse measure of the marginal cost to
produce quality. So, at a small μ it is expensive to produce high- quality goods
and henceforth a cost advantage to produce high-quality goods because of a
relative abundance of skilled workers will hardly lead to higher quality goods. A
similar intuition holds for the effect of ´ on the elasticity of the export price with
respect to skill abundance, which rises with ´.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we put forward a theoretical mechanism to explain the ﬁnding
in Schott (2004) that more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher
priced goods. Factor input bundles are non-homotheticwith higher quality goods
requiring relativelymore skilledworkers. This implies that in skill abundant coun-
tries ﬁrms have an incentive to produce higher quality goods.Withmarginal costs
rising in quality, higher quality goods also have higher prices. We incorporated
this mechanism in a monopolistic competition model of trade adding a role for
distance and importerGDPper capita in thedeterminationof tradedgoodsprices
implying a Washington apples effect. We estimated the effect of skill abundance
and distance using a dataset with multiple importers and exporters containing
export unit values as proxy for export prices. We found, as expected, that traded
goods prices rise in the twomentioned variables andused the estimated elasticities
to calibrate the parameters of themodel. Simulating the impact of changes in dis-
tance, we found an effect of distance on the skill premium in ourmodel. Countries
at a larger distance from their trading partners display a stronger Washington
apples effect, raising the quality of goods sold and bought. Because of the skill
intensity of high-quality goods this raises the nominal skill premium (a supply-
side effect) and because of the non-homotheticity of demand this also reduces
the relative quality-adjusted price level of high-income, high-skilled workers (a
demand-side effect).
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